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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New London has provoked rigorous debate over
the proper discretion given to government entities exercising powers of eminent domain. Rarely
discussed is the equally important requirement of necessity. The necessity doctrine requires that a
condemnor justify that the proposed taking is reasonably necessary for the stated purpose. Few
attorneys and even fewer scholars have discussed the role of necessity doctrine in modern eminent
domain practice. This manuscript traces the history and development of necessity, discusses cases
where courts have prevented takings for lack of sufficient necessity, and suggests opportunities for
practitioners to better challenge eminent domain proceedings. This manuscript concludes that
necessity should be revived from its largely dormant state and can play a meaningful role in
curbing the worst excesses of eminent domain.

This Article examines a largely ignored aspect of eminent domain:
“necessity.” The necessity doctrine requires that a condemnor justify
1
a proposed taking as necessary for furthering a proposed public use.
In some states, the doctrine is created explicitly through constitutional or statutory provisions; in others, the courts have found it to be
an implicit constraint on condemnation arising from the state’s con2
stitutional or statutory structure. Necessity determinations implicate
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See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 15 (Nev. 2003) (“In
an eminent domain proceeding, necessity is usually raised in the context of challenging
whether a project furthers a public purpose and therefore constitutes a public use. It involves whether the property to be taken is necessary to accomplish the public purpose
and it encompasses the selection of the location of the condemned land.” (footnote omitted)).
See 71 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (2008) (noting that to constitute a valid exercise of
eminent domain power, “private property can only be taken out of ‘necessity’ to accomplish an identified ‘public purpose’”).
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not only narrow considerations, such as the selection of the specific
land to be condemned for the public use, but also the much broader
and often contentious question of whether the exercise of the eminent domain power is actually needed to further the public purpose
3
at stake.
While necessity is a counterpart to the more analyzed and wellknown public use doctrine, it is analytically distinct and raises different concerns. Those differences are significant. Public use has been
thoroughly explored in both court opinions and the legal literature,
particularly in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision
4
in Kelo v. City of New London. By contrast, although courts often refer
3

4

Id. § 1 (discussing necessity as “involv[ing] whether the property to be taken is necessary
to accomplish the public purpose and encompasses the selection of the location of the
condemned land”).
545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled that the city’s use of eminent domain to condemn private property for the purpose of economic redevelopment through
private enterprise ownership constituted a valid “public use” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Id. at 488–90. Kelo examined the breadth of what
constitutes a permissible public use that suffices for takings under eminent domain. The
public use doctrine has already been, and in the future will likely continue to be, the subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007); Richard O. Brooks, Kelo and the
“Whaling City”: The Failure of the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Articulate a Public Purpose of
Sustainability, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS: FOUR ESSAYS 5 (2006), available at
http://www.vjel.org/takings/Brooks_article.pdf; Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A Potpourri of Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
799 (2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13
(2005); Scott Griswold, Property Rights vs. Public Use: Analyzing Tennessee’s Response to Kelo
Eminent Domain Ruling, 43 TENN. B.J. 14 (2007); George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do With It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803 (2008); Carol
J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determination of Public Use and Eminent Domain in
Economic Development Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 43 (2006); David Schultz, Economic Development and Eminent Domain after Kelo: Property Rights and “Public Use” Under State
Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 41 (2006); David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be
Mine: Are There Any Private Takings After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 195 (2006); Mark Seidenfeld, In Search of Robin Hood: Suggested Legislative Responses to Kelo, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305 (2008); Christopher Serkin, Local Property
Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV 883 (2007); Viola Vetter,
Kelo: Midkiff’s Latest Victim, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 257 (2006); Lucas J. Asper,
Comment, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent Domain: “Just Compensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489 (2007); Justin Morgan Crane,
Note & Comment, The Privatization of Public Use: Why Rational Basis Review of a Private
Property Condemnation is a Violation of a Fundamental Civil Right, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 511
(2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public
Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London,
54 DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2005); Scott P. Ledet, Comment, The Kelo Effect: Eminent Domain
and Property Rights in Louisiana, 67 LA. L. REV. 171 (2006); James J. Ferrelli, Eminent Domain in New Jersey After Kelo: What’s Next?, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 44.
Interestingly, the Kelo trial court found that part of the parcels at issue in the case
could not be taken because there was no necessity for the taking. See Kelo v. City of New
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to necessity in the context of evaluating takings, they seldom discuss it
extensively and only the occasional court has refused to allow a taking
to proceed because of lack of necessity. However, with the public use
limitation on the takings power diminished by Kelo, necessity is one of
the few remaining potential checks on the eminent domain power.
The doctrine warrants further analysis and heightened attention by
courts and scholars.
Part I of this Article outlines the history and development of eminent domain necessity jurisprudence. This Part reviews the comments of treatise writers as well as examines the historical origins of
modern necessity doctrine. We find that necessity questions have
traditionally been left to the judgment of the legislature and that necessity and public use rules are sometimes conflated.
Part II examines successful necessity challenges to takings on the
5
grounds that the proposed plan was too remote or speculative. This
Part discusses cases in which courts have concluded that planners
have failed to show necessity to condemn because of a vague plan,
uncertain timing of the execution of that plan, and other considerations. Part III examines successful challenges on the basis that procedural or regulatory hurdles impeding development make the government’s plan not viable on necessity grounds. We conclude that
this long dormant cousin of “public use” has significant potential for
landowners as a defense to eminent domain takings.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE
Early eminent domain cases arose primarily in the state courts,
under either state statutory or constitutional law. Because of these
state law origins, the legal rules pertaining to eminent domain displayed considerable variety in their early stages. By the early nine-

5

London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, finding that the legislature’s determination was entitled to
deference. 843 A.2d 500, 572 (Conn. 2004). The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, framed
the case as raising an issue of public use. 545 U.S. at 472.
A natural progression would be to focus first on the role of necessity in federal eminent
domain proceedings. However, federal courts have long deemed necessity review of federal proceedings beyond the purview of the judicial function and the sole provenance of
the legislature. See, e.g., Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900) (“The
general rule is that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for
public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the determination of the legislative branch of the government . . . .”); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878)
(“When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular
property is not a subject of judicial cognizance.”). Instead, we focus our efforts in this article on the diverse interpretations of necessity in state courts.
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teenth century, however, the basic principles underlying the modern
framework of eminent domain law had begun to emerge and coa6
lesce. As part of this natural evolution and development in legal
doctrine, courts clarified the role of “necessity” in the takings decision-making process.
From the outset, American legal doctrine recognized that the sov7
ereign has an inherent power of eminent domain; i.e., the power “of
taking or of authorizing the taking of any property within its jurisdic8
tion for the public good.” This historical view of eminent domain as
an inherent power necessarily colors the law’s perception of the outer
limits of the power. Thus, the constitutional provisions that address
eminent domain are couched in terms of limitations on this sovereign power (i.e., that the taking be for a public “use” or “purpose”
and that just compensation be paid), and not in terms of an express

6

See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by the
Government, 1789–1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 132, 133 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds., 1978) (describing the history of
eminent domain law); J.A.C. Grant, The “Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1931) (discussing how courts dealt with the question of whether
“higher law” guaranteed compensation for takings throughout history); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972) (developing a
framework for analyzing eminent domain principles). It was only in 1875 that the U.S.
Supreme Court definitively ruled that the federal government had an eminent domain
power of its own. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875) (holding that the
postal power includes power to obtain sites for post offices by eminent domain); see also 1
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.24 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter NICHOLS 3d] (discussing history and development of federal government’s eminent
domain power). In addition, before the Fifth Amendment’s limitation on federal takings
was extended to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1896, state takings were seldom reviewed in federal court. See Lawrence Berger, The
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 207 (1978) (noting that “the
use of condemnation to open private roads from one person’s land across the property of
others to the public roads was a necessity if the country was to be developed” and consequently, a fully developed system of condemnation evolved which federal courts rarely reviewed); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599, 599–600 n.4 (1949) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Eminent Domain
Clause is “not directly applicable to the states”).

7

According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s classic statement, the taking power is a “political
necessity” because “[s]uch an authority is essential to [the sovereign’s] independent existence and perpetuity.” Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371; see also 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 672 (3d ed. 1909) (“The power of eminent
domain, being an incident of sovereignty, is inherent in the federal government and in
the several States, by virtue of their sovereignty.”); id. at 7 (“[T]he power of eminent domain is not a reversed [sic] [power], but an inherent right, a right which pertains to sovereignty as a necessary, constant and inextinguishable attribute.” (footnotes omitted)).

8

1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH
AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE 1 (2d ed. 1917) [hereinafter
NICHOLS 2d].
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9

grant of the power to take in the first place. Because of the predominance of this early view of the eminent domain power as being
10
inherent within the sovereign, it is not surprising that necessity determinations were also deemed to lie within the discretion of the legislature, and that the courts’ role in making such determinations was
historically constrained.
A. Historical Development of the Role of Necessity Within Eminent Domain
Doctrine
Modern notions of eminent domain did not arise until after the
11
decline of the feudal system in Europe. The timing was logical and
natural, as eminent domain was unnecessary in feudal societies,
where the sovereign was the ultimate owner of all land such that the
confiscation of land for a public improvement “would not . . . involve
12
the taking of property in its modern sense.” Although the decline of
feudalism and the concomitant rise of individual property ownership
and recognition of private property rights ultimately gave rise to

9

10

11

12

U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”). None of the early state constitutions explicitly granted the power of
eminent domain to the states. See 1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 58 (“The provisions
found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public
use therefore do not by implication grant the power of eminent domain to the government of the state, but they limit a power already existing which would otherwise be unlimited.”). Even the Fifth Amendment is phrased in terms of a restraint upon a power that is
nowhere explicitly granted to the federal government. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL,
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 73–77 (1987) (discussing the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (discussing the
adoption and ratification of the Fifth Amendment).
Early proponents of the natural law theory, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Bynkershoek, and Montesquieu, discussed eminent domain in terms of an inherent power. See
generally 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 503 (“This power [of eminent domain] was originally in
the people, in their sovereign capacity, and was by them delegated to the legislature in
the general grant of legislative power.”); PAUL, supra note 9, at 74–77; Arthur Lenhoff,
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 596–601 (1942);
Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 559–600.
Nichols notes that the extent to which eminent domain was recognized and used under
Roman law is unclear, but that any such power used by the Romans disappeared after the
fall of the Roman Empire, and did not re-emerge until post-feudalism days. 1 NICHOLS
2d, supra note 8, at 5. Nichols noted:
The origin of the power of eminent domain is lost in obscurity, since before the title of the individual property owner as against the state was recognized and protected by law, the right to take land for public use was merged in the general power of the government over all persons and property within its jurisdiction.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
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13

modern notions of eminent domain, the transition did not occur
overnight. For example, even as private property rights evolved and
gained heightened legal stature and protection, the English king retained significant rights under common law to take private land for
constructing structures for defense against the public enemy or the
sea (such as lighthouses) without compensation, or to take provisions
14
for the royal household with compensation.
Modern notions of eminent domain seemed to have developed
from an English procedure known as “inquest of office,” which allowed the taking of private property for purposes such as the construction of new roads through the issuance of a writ of ad quod dam15
num and a proceeding in which a jury determined damages.
However, this proceeding was ex parte and the property owner had
no right to be notified of the proceeding, to object to the location of
16
the new road, or to challenge the amount of damages awarded.
Thus, the sovereign was not required to answer to the courts in any
way in terms of the “necessity” of the taking.
The American colonies adopted the notion of eminent domain
from English law, and initially used the power of eminent domain
17
primarily for the establishment of roads. Because land in colonial
America was, for the most part, undeveloped and plentiful and, in
18
fact, often had not even been assigned to private ownership, the application of eminent domain in the American colonies was rather informal. Compensation, particularly where the land was unimproved,
was often not required by law as such land was viewed as having little,
19
if any, value. Nonetheless, the English system of ad quod damnum
had a clear influence upon early colonial practices, and juries were
often used to determine the course of roads and the damages due to
20
land owners whose property was taken. However, as in England, this
procedure was apparently more administrative than judicial in na13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13–14; see also Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 563–66. Other early uses of eminent domain were uses that had a clear public use or public purpose, such as to foster improvements such as the development of mills or the drainage of land. See Philip Nichols, Jr.,
The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 617 (1940)
(“Only a few situations existed, in the primitive America of that day, where eminent domain was felt to be needed. These included rights of way for roads and flowage easements for mills.”).
1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
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ture, and proceedings were often ex parte, affording the landowner
21
no right of notification or opportunity to be heard.
There are hints in colonial law of “necessity” playing a limited role
in these early exercises of the eminent domain power. For example,
when lands were initially granted in colonial Pennsylvania, it was with
the understanding that six percent of the land was reserved for highways; as a result, the sovereign did not need to exercise eminent domain to construct such roads. Nonetheless, a 1700 Pennsylvania colonial law provided “that no such road shall be carried through any
man’s improved lands, but where there is a necessity for same” and
required the empanelment of a six-man jury to determine the value
22
of the improvements so taken and the compensation due the owner.
However, in these early takings, the judiciary, to the extent it was
involved at all, was concerned primarily with the issues of damages
and adequate compensation; the question of the necessity of the taking itself got short, if any, shrift from the courts. Rather, the courts
viewed the issue of necessity as one to be decided by the legislature or
its delegates, not by the courts. Christopher Teideman, in his influential late nineteenth century treatise on the police power, summarized the status of early eminent domain law as follows:
Except so far as the exercise of the power may be limited and controlled
by provisions of the constitution, the necessity for its exercise is left to the
legislative discretion. The courts cannot question the necessity for the
taking, provided the land is taken for a public purpose. The legislative
determination of the necessity is final, and is not subject to review by the
23
courts.

B. The Historical Role of the Judiciary in Determinations of Necessity
Modern necessity doctrine has been shaped largely by historical
notions of the proper relationship between the legislature and the
judiciary. Philip Nichols, the author of a leading turn-of-thetwentieth-century treatise on eminent domain law, extensively discussed the balance between judicial and legislative power, stating:
“The exercise by a court of the power to nullify the wishes of the representatives of the people, enacted into law in solemn form, is indeed
full of grave responsibility and not to be called into play indiscrimi-

21
22
23

2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 900.
Act of 1700, quoted in Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates 153, 1801 WL 743, at *2 (Pa. 1801); see also 1
NICHOLS, 2d, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the statute in Feree and other such laws).
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 372–73
(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1886).
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24

nately.”
Nichols further stated that there were three canons by
which the court’s power to overturn a legislative decision was constrained in the early years of the republic. The first of these dealt
with the presumption of validity that was to be afforded legislative decision making:
Every presumption should be made in favor of the validity of a statute. It
is not to be held a violation of the fundamental charter established by the
people in their constitution unless so clearly outside the power conferred
upon the legislature as to be free from reasonable doubt in that regard.
It must be assumed that the legislature intended to act within its lawful
bounds, and this assumption cannot be overthrown unless the statute
25
unmistakably oversteps these bounds by manifest and plain terms.

Nichols thus described a sharp philosophical difference in how
the courts defined their role vis-à-vis the legislature: “[T]he courts
have nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of a statute,
26
and . . . questions of public or governmental policy are not judicial.”
However, Nichols also ruefully noted that over time, as the power
of the judiciary to set aside legislative acts became more recognized,
“it became a common thing for courts to declare statutes to be unconstitutional upon strained and technical reasoning, whenever they
27
seemed to the courts to be unfair or even merely unwise.” Nichols,
by contrast, embraced the notion of judicial deference to legislative
decision making, stating:
When a court is asked to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature, a co-ordinate branch of the government, the court should not
decide whether in its own opinion the act is constitutional or not, but
whether the members of the legislature, as reasonable men, might have
fairly considered it constitutional. Every presumption is in favor of the
validity of the law, and it is only when it seems clearly a violation of the
28
constitution “at first blush” that the court will hold it invalid.

Nichols viewed public use challenges to takings in these terms as
well, stating that “the question, as it presents itself to the courts, is not
whether the use for which the property is taken is public, but whether
29
the legislature might reasonably consider it public.” However, Nichols also recognized an outer limit on the deference due the legislature by the judiciary, concluding that:

24
25

26
27
28
29

1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 34.
Id. at 35. The other two canons dealt with constitutional limitations on the legislature
(which were to be measured in general terms of liberty and justice), and in the interpretation of the Constitution by an independent judiciary. Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 154.
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[I]f the court, after giving due weight.to [sic] the declaration of the legislature, considers that the purpose for which the taking of property has
been authorized has no real and substantial relation to the public use, it
is its duty to declare the act authorizing the taking to be unconstitu30
tional.

In practice, however, the erosion of judicial deference to legislative decision making that Nichols lamented did not seem to extend to
determinations of necessity, which remained largely within the realm
31
of the legislature. While the court might, in rare instances, determine that there was no necessity present such that the taking was invalid, if any necessity was present, no matter how slight, the court generally viewed the exercise of the eminent domain power as a
32
legislative question beyond its purview. Moreover, this deference
was not diminished just because the legislature might have chosen to
delegate all or part of its condemning authority to a specific agency
or entity (such as a public or private corporation) as state legislatures
33
were (and still are) empowered to do. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court: “[T]he necessity and expediency of the taking of
property for public use ‘are legislative questions, no matter who may

30
31

Id.

32

33

Id. at 155.
See 1A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, § 4.11[1] (describing necessity determination as a legislative power). As Nichols remarks:
When the legislature has made its decision and has authorized the taking of land
by eminent domain, the owner has no constitutional right to have this decision reviewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard by a court on the question whether
the public improvement for which it is taken is required by public necessity and
convenience, or whether it is necessary or expedient that his land be taken for
such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the taking is a mere pretense.
See also Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900) (“The general rule is
that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for public use is not
a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the determination of the legislative branch of
the government . . . .”).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 910–11 (“In every case therefore it is a judicial question
whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or may be founded on a public necessity.
But while the courts have frequently declared their power to set aside acts of the legislature upon such a ground, cases in which the power has been actually exercised seem rarely to have arisen.” (footnote omitted)).
See id. at 920 (“The legislature may, and usually does, delegate the power of selecting the
land to be condemned to the public agent that is to do the work.”); see also Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“The property may be appropriated by an act of the
legislature, or the power of appropriating it may be delegated to private corporations, to
be exercised by them in the execution of works in which the public is interested.”); People ex rel. Herrick v. Smith, 21 N.Y. 595, 598 (N.Y. 1860) (stating that the eminent domain
power “may be exercised by means of a statute which shall at once designate the property
to be appropriated and the purpose of the appropriation; or it may be delegated to public officers, or, as it has been repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry
on enterprises in which the public are interested”).
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34

be charged with their decision.’” Thus, the non-legislative recipient
of the eminent domain power was typically afforded much the same
judicial deference with regard to the necessity of the taking as was the
legislature, provided the recipient acted “reasonably and in good
35
faith” in making the necessity determination.
Nichols and the author of another early treatise on eminent domain, John Lewis, both discussed extensively the meaning of “necessity” and the role of the courts in evaluating this issue in early takings
cases. Both asserted that the element of necessity raises three questions: (1) whether a particular public improvement should be constructed; (2) where such an improvement should be located; and (3)
whether the eminent domain power should be employed to acquire
36
the property needed for the improvement. However, Nichols and
Lewis placed all of these questions squarely within the exclusive do37
main and jurisdiction of the legislature, as did early courts. Nichols
explained the basis for this rule in historical terms, stating:
34
35

36
37

N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 284 (1925) (citations omitted).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 920; see TIEDEMAN, supra note 23, at 376 (collecting cases
and noting it is “constitutionally unobjectionable to delegate to the corporation or individual, along with the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the power to determine
finally upon the necessity for the taking, without any judicial investigation”).
However, Nichols stated where the legislature had delegated the eminent domain
authority to a non-legislative body, such as a public agency or private corporation, the
courts were less reluctant to evaluate the necessity of the underlying taking than they
would have been if the legislature had made the determination itself. See 2 NICHOLS 2d,
supra note 8, at 921 (“[T]he courts may hold [determinations of necessity made by delegated parties] to be unlawful without the reluctance they feel in declaring acts of the legislature unconstitutional.”). While the courts would not interfere where some necessity
was present, a complete lack of necessity for the taking was a judicial question to which a
positive answer would render the taking unauthorized and would warrant judicial intervention. Id.
See 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1053; 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908.
For Nichols, see 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908 (“When the legislature has made its
decision and has authorized the taking of land by eminent domain, the owner has no
constitutional right to have this decision reviewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard
by a court on the question whether the public improvement for which it is taken is required by public necessity and convenience, or whether it is necessary and expedient that
his land be taken for such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the taking is
mere pretense.”). For Lewis, see 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 503 (“The necessity, expediency or propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain, and the extent and manner of its exercise, are questions of general public policy and belong to the legislative department of the government.”). See also id. at 674 (“Whether the power of eminent
domain shall be put in motion for any particular public purpose, and whether the exigencies of the occasion and the public welfare require or justify its exercise, are questions
which rest entirely with the legislature.”). For the early court decisions, see Richland
School Twp. v. Overmeyer, 73 N.E. 811, 813 (Ind. 1905) (“The authority to determine in any
case whether it is necessary or expedient to permit the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, when not prohibited by the Constitution, rests with the legislative department of
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[T]he courts have no power to revise any enactment of the legislature
unless it violates some clause of the constitution. The constitutions of the
great majority of the states contain no provision prohibiting the taking of
land for public use except for necessary or economically expedient undertakings, or unless the work can be done in no other way, nor was it
the practice when the state constitutions were adopted to require a judicial hearing upon the question of necessity in eminent domain cases, so
that it can be plausibly argued that such a hearing is essential to due
38
process of law.

Lewis and Nichols made clear their understandings that the answer to
the first question—whether a particular public improvement should
be constructed—in particular lay solely within the legislature’s deci39
sion-making authority. This result, Nichols found, followed directly
from the independent power of the legislature to make determinations of the need for specific public improvements. As Nichols succinctly put it:
If the legislature should determine that it was unwise to establish a public
improvement for which there was a considerable demand, no one would
suppose that such a determination could be reviewed by the courts, and
the principle is the same if the determination of the legislature is the
40
other way.

The second question—whether a particular piece of property is
needed for the improvement—was also a matter left solely to the leg41
islature. The theme of judicial deference to legislative determina-

38
39

40
41

the state; and the propriety of taking private property for public use is not a judicial question, but one of political sovereignty, and a hearing upon the facts as to such propriety or
necessity is not required.”), overruled in part by Cemetery Co. v. Warren Sch. Tp., 139
N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 1957); In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 431 (N.Y.
1888) (“[T]he necessity or expediency of taking private property for [public] uses by the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, the instrumentalities to be used and the extent
to which such right shall be delegated are questions appertaining to the political and legislative branches of the government . . . .”).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 909.
See id. at 908 (noting “as there is no fixed principle which decides what public improvements shall be undertaken and where they shall be located, these questions must be settled by some department of the government”; that body, Nichols concluded, is the legislature); see also 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 678 (“The courts cannot inquire into the motives
which actuate the authorities or enter into the propriety of making the particular improvements.”); 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1056 (“The necessity of making any proposed
work or improvement is also a [sic] purely a legislative question, unless otherwise provided by the constitution or statute.”).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908–09.
See 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1068 (“[T]hose invested with the power of eminent domain
for a public purpose, can make their own location according to their own views of what is
best or expedient, and this discretion cannot be controlled by the courts.”); 2 NICHOLS
2d, supra note 8, at 899 (“[T]he laying out or establishment of a specific public improvement and consequently the determination that a certain definite tract of private land
shall be taken by eminent domain for such improvement is a purely legislative act, and
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tions of location was established early on, led in part by pragmatic
considerations. A landowner could not argue that the taking of his
land was not “necessary” because a neighbor’s land was just as (or
42
perhaps more) suitable for the legislature’s purpose. The condemnor often had to choose between two equally useful or similarlysituated parcels of property. Neither could be considered “uniquely
necessary” because of the existence of the other as a suitable option,
yet nonetheless one or the other had to be chosen if the project was
to go forward.
By the early twentieth century, this notion of judicial deference to
legislative determinations regarding siting was firmly entrenched in
both the courts’ opinions and in the scholarly commentary. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1900: “The general rule is
that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property
for public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the
43
determination of the legislative branch of the government.” Similarly, Nichols noted: “When it is decided to take land by eminent
domain, what land shall be taken and how much, are matters in the
discretion of the legislature,” although he qualified that statement by
44
adding that “land that manifestly cannot be used cannot be taken.”
Thus, when there was no necessity to justify the taking, Nichols found
that the taking would be unlawful, but where the land could be put to
some use for the public good at stake, the “degree of necessity” was
45
not a judicial matter.
This qualification (that “land that manifestly cannot be used cannot be taken”) merges into Nichols’s and Lewis’s third question—
whether the eminent domain power should be exercised to acquire
the property needed for the improvement—which is similarly re-

42

43

44

45

can be effected without the intervention of the courts at any stage of the proceedings . . . .”).
See Kansas & Tex. Coal Ry. Co. v. N.W. Coal & Mining Co., 61 S.W. 684, 690 (Mo. 1901)
(noting that if the rule were otherwise, “the plaintiff could not condemn any land; for
every other landowner would likewise have the same right to object to his land being
condemned”).
Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900). The Court went on to state:
“The State possesses the [takings] power as a sovereign and as a sovereign exerts it. How
can its citizens call on the courts to review the grounds on which the State has acted in
the absence of legislation permitting that to be done?” Id.; see also Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance.”).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 918–19. As Nichols explained, “The owner of the land
which it has been decided to take is not entitled to be heard upon the question whether
an equally available site was not already in possession of the public, or could be bought
elsewhere for less than the fair value of his land.” Id. at 917.
Id. at 921.
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solved by the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislature, and in state constitutional provisions. According to Lewis, in
the absence of a state constitutional provision to the contrary, “[t]he
question of exercising the power of eminent domain for any particu46
lar public use is solely for the legislature.”
And as Nichols explained, “[t]he constitutions of the great majority of the states contain no provision prohibiting the taking of land for public use except
47
for necessary or economically expedient undertakings.”
However, Nichols noted “a theoretical limit beyond which the leg48
islature cannot go.” Takings ostensibly made in furtherance of a
public improvement which the condemnation “can never by any possibility serve” or takings for uses that are not public would deprive the
landowner of property without due process, and so would call for ju49
dicial intervention. In short, Nichols concluded, the judiciary could
intervene only where the legislature “had acted with total lack of
50
judgment or in bad faith.” Although this rule would seem to leave
the landowner with little protection from ill-conceived acts of the legislature, Lewis dismissed such concerns, stating:
The owner is assumed to be sufficiently protected from an abuse of the
power by the fact that the condemnor is not likely to take and pay for
property which it does not need and which it cannot sell and cannot lawfully use for any other purpose than that for which it was con51
demned . . . .

Despite the overwhelmingly strong notion that determinations of
necessity were legislative questions, the judiciary nonetheless retained
a role in necessity determinations. The judiciary typically intervened
in one of two instances. The first involved abuses of discretion; the
second was where a statute specifically granted the court a role in
these decision-making processes.
Nichols addressed the first instance—abuses of discretion—in his
treatise. His analysis was based on the fundamental notion that a per-

46

47
48
49

50
51

2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1056. The exception is where the state constitution does provide
for judicial review of the necessity for the taking. Lewis, for example, describes in detail a
decision by the Supreme Court of Vermont, which, faced with a state constitution providing that private property can be taken for public use only when it is necessary for such
use, ruled that necessity was thus a judicial question. See id. at 1053–55 (discussing Stearns
v. Barre, 50 A. 1086 (Vt. 1901)).
2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 909.
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 910 (stating that the Due Process Clause “would protect an individual
who was deprived of his property under pretense of eminent domain in ostensible behalf
of a public enterprise for which it could not be used”).
Id.
2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1055.
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son whose property is taken by eminent domain is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that an arbitrary, unfair, or unjust taking is not allowed, even if the taking is for the public use and
52
the property owner is compensated.
The second instance where the judiciary could make evaluations
of necessity involved situations in which a specific law gave the court
the power to do so. For example, Michigan passed a constitutional
provision in 1851 that made the determination of necessity a decision
for a jury or commissioners appointed by a court. This body considered both the necessity of the improvement and the necessity of tak53
ing the land at issue for the improvement. In discussing legislative
delegations of necessity determinations to the judiciary, Nichols explained:
Such a duty [determining the necessity of a proposed taking], although
primarily legislative, is not so essentially unjudicial that to impose it upon
a court is a violation of the principle of the separation of powers, and in
several states it has been enacted with respect to particular classes of public improvements that land shall not be taken unless the taking is found
54
to be necessary by the court.

This suggests that traditional judicial deference to the legislature’s
determinations of necessity was premised on respect for legislative sovereignty and for the distinct roles of the judiciary and legislature, as
opposed to any inherent limitation on judicial power. In general,
however, the courts traditionally have taken a hands-off approach to
issues of necessity. As summarized by the Illinois Supreme Court in a
1951 case:
[W]here the right to condemn exists, and the property is subject to the
right of eminent domain and is being condemned for a public use, and
the right to condemn is not being abused, courts cannot deny the right
to condemn on the ground that the exercise of the power is unnecessary
or not expedient, as the determination of that question devolves upon
the legislative branch of the government and is a question which the ju55
dicial branch of the government cannot determine.

The court went on to define the role of the judiciary narrowly:
[C]ourts may only rightfully determine whether a petitioner has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain, whether the property is
subject to the right of eminent domain and is being taken for a public
use, whether the power is being abused, as by the taking of an excessive
amount of property, and other kindred questions which do not involve a

52
53
54
55

See 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 897–98 (noting the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
arbitrary takings).
See id. at 922 (discussing the Michigan constitutional provision).
Id. at 923.
City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 97 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. 1951).
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determination of the necessity or expediency of the taking of the lands
56
sought to be condemned.

In short, questions of the necessity of taking have historically fallen to
the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide. Even today, the courts
profess to have little role in reviewing these legislative actions, in the
57
absence of legislative bad faith and abuse of discretion.
C. The Overlap Between Necessity and Public Use
There is a significant overlap between “necessity” and “public
use,” and this overlap has colored the way in which the courts have
historically analyzed these issues. “Public use” is a term fraught with
controversy and subject to considerable interpretative nuances under
58
modern law. Historically, the state courts, in particular, have diverged on how they treat the term. Courts adopting the narrower
view of the concept of “public use” require that the condemned
property be employed only for projects where the public can actually
directly use the property acquired (e.g., for a road, school, park, or
59
other public good). By contrast, courts adopting the broad view
treat “public use” as coterminous with “public advantage” or “public
60
benefit.” Under this view, “public use” is broadly defined as “‘con61
ducive to community prosperity,’” which would include “[a]ny exercise of eminent domain which tends to enlarge resources, increase

56
57

58

59
60
61

Id.
See City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230, 235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (“[A] condemnor’s determination of necessity should not be disturbed on judicial review in the absence of fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct.”); City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Champion, 261 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. 1979) (“The question of whether there is a necessity for
taking the fee is a matter of legislative discretion, which will not be interfered with or controlled unless the authority acts in bad faith or beyond the powers conferred upon it by
law.”); Westrick v. Approval of Bond of Peoples Natural Gas Co., 520 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (“Administrative decisions of a condemnor concerning the amount,
location, or type of estate condemned are not subject to judicial review unless such decisions are in bad faith, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of power.”); HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v.
Seattle Popular Monorail Auth. (In re Seattle Monorail Popular Auth.), 121 P.3d 1166,
1175 (Wash. 2005) (“A declaration of necessity by a proper municipal authority is conclusive in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct, as would constitute constructive fraud.”).
See generally 2A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, §§ 7.01[1], 7.02[3] (discussing meaning of
“public use”); Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives,
and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 45, 52–57 (2008) (discussing the same).
See 2A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, § 7.02[2] (discussing the narrow view of public use).
See id. § 7.01[2].
Id. § 7.02[4] (quoting People of Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946)).
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industrial energies, or promote the productive power of any consid62
erable number of inhabitants of a state or community.”
63
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its historical adoption of the
broad view of public use in Kelo v. City of New London. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, stated that “this ‘Court long ago rejected any
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
64
general public.’”
Instead, the Kelo majority turned to what it
deemed the “broader and more natural interpretation of public use
65
as ‘public purpose.’” The Court also emphasized the “great respect”
that the federal courts should pay the state courts and legislatures in
66
identifying local public needs, stating that: “When the legislature’s
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make
clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than
debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legisla67
tion—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.” Rather, “if a
legislature . . . determines there are substantial reasons for an exer-

62
63

64
65

66
67

Id. § 7.02[3].
See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (pointing out
the “inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test” for public use); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896) (finding that “public use” means
furthering a public interest).
545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
Id. at 480. The Kelo majority had a long line of precedent to look to, in which the Court
had repeatedly held that the judicial role in the public use inquiry was extremely limited.
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determining whether that [eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an
extremely narrow one.”). The Kelo Court in particular turned to Berman, where it had
found that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive” enough to allow
the use of eminent domain to achieve any legislatively permissible end, Kelo, 545 U.S. at
481 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33), and its 1984 decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), where the Court stated that the eminent domain power is
“coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers,” id. at 240, and that a taking
must be upheld if it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” Id. at 241.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606–07
(1908)).
Id. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43). As explained in the leading treatise in
the area of eminent domain law:
When the legislature has authorized the exercise of eminent domain in a particular case, it has necessarily adjudicated that the land to be taken is needed for the
public use, and no other or further adjudication is necessary. When the legislature has made its decision and has authorized the taking of land by eminent domain, the owner has no constitutional right to have this decision reviewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard by a court on the question whether the public
improvement for which it is taken is required by public necessity and convenience,
or whether it is necessary or expedient that his land be taken for such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the taking is a mere pretense.
See 1A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 7, § 4.11[1].
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cise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that
68
the taking will serve a public use.”
Treating “public use” as coterminous with “public purpose,” however, does little to resolve the question of what types of takings are
permissible, as the term “public purpose” itself is subject to consider69
able variations in interpretation. Moreover, the high degree of deference afforded by both state and federal courts to legislative determinations to condemn property means that property owners can
expect little relief from takings by falling back on arguments relating
to public use.
Theoretically, “public use” and “necessity” are completely distinct
70
inquiries.
Necessity usually arises in the context of determining
whether the proposed project furthers a public purpose and thus is a
71
public use. Whether “public use” is present is clearly a question for
72
the judiciary, while determination of “necessity” (i.e., whether the
proposed project furthers the stated public use) is for the legisla73
ture. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Shoemaker v. United States:
[W]hile the courts have power to determine whether the use for which
private property is authorized by the legislature to be taken, is in fact a
public use, yet, if this question is decided in the affirmative, the judicial
function is exhausted; that the extent to which such property shall be
taken for such use rests wholly in the legislative discretion, subject only to
74
the restraint that just compensation must be made.

Thus, the courts may not “substitute their own judgment” for that of
the legislature or reject a taking simply because the legislature could

68
69

70

71

72
73

74

Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
In the words of an Illinois Appellate Court, “[w]hat constitutes a ‘public purpose’ . . . has
plagued the American judiciary ever since it arrogated to itself the prerogative of interpreting constitutions.” Lake Louise Improvement Ass’n v. Multimedia Cablevision, 510
N.E.2d 982, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 502–03 (“Nearly all the cases, however, hold that the question of
necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and that the former question is exclusively for the legislature.”).
See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 15 (Nev. 2003) (“In
an eminent domain proceeding, necessity is usually raised in the context of challenging
whether a project furthers a public purpose and therefore constitutes a public use.”).
1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 499 (“[P]rivate property can be taken only for public use,
and . . . what is a public use is a question for the courts.”).
Id. at 503 (“[T]he question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use,
and . . . the former question is exclusively for the legislature”); see also TIEDEMAN, supra
note 23, at 378 (“It is a legislative question whether the public exigencies require the appropriation, but it is a clearly a judicial question, whether a particular confiscation of land
has been made for a public purpose.”).
147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); see also In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 431
(N.Y. 1888) (stating that when a use is public, the necessity of the taking is not a matter
for the judiciary, but for the “political and legislative branches”).
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have achieved the public purpose through a different mechanism or
75
method.
In practice, however, the distinction between the “public use” and
76
“necessity” was, and still is, murky. “Public use” historically was (and
77
still is) often defined in terms of “necessity.” For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in 1911 that: “The right to take private property for a public use is founded upon and limited by public
necessity. Where the necessity stops there stops the right to take,
78
both as to amount of land and the nature of the interest therein.”
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the California Supreme
Court defined necessity in terms of public use, providing that eminent domain is “the right of the sovereignty to use the property of its
79
members for the public good or public necessity.” Similarly, Lewis
stated that even though a state’s constitution and statutes might be
silent on the issue of necessity, “the power to take is, in every case, limited to such and so much property as is necessary for the public use
80
in question.” Necessity, in this context, means only a reasonable,
81
but not an absolute, necessity, and the requirement is deemed met
75
76

77

78
79

80
81

See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency, 76 P.3d at 15.
See Thornton Dev. Auth. v. Upah, 640 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D. Colo. 1986) (“[T]he issues
of necessity and public purpose are closely related and, to some extent, interconnected.”).
For example, Nichols defines “public use” serving:
(1) to enable the United States or a state or one of its subdivisions to carry on its
governmental functions, and to preserve the safety, health and comfort of the public, whether or not the individual members of the public may make use of the
property so taken, provided the taking is made by a public body; [or] (2) to serve
the public with some necessity or convenience of life which is required by the public as
such and which cannot be readily furnished without the aid of some governmental
power, whether or not the taking is made by a public body, provided the public
may enjoy such service as of right.
1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 140 (emphasis added).
In re Winnisimmet Co., 95 N.E. 293, 294 (Mass. 1911).
Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 250 (1861). Moreover, the court went on to state:
“The word necessity, in this connection, is not to be used in too limited a sense; it means a
want, an exigency, an expediency, for the interest or safety of the State.” Id. It also discussed public use specifically, stating:
If the use for which the property is taken be to satisfy a great public want or public
exigency, it is a public use in the meaning of the Constitution, and the State is not
limited to any given mode of applying that property to satisfy the want, or to meet
the exigency.
Id. at 251. Interestingly, the Massachusetts State Constitution also provides for compensation “whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should
be appropriated to public uses.” MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court has determined that “public exigenc[ies]” encompass “public convenience and necessity.” Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.)
360, 392 (1839).
2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1060.
Id. at 1062.
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if “the property sought to be condemned would conduce to some extent to the accomplishment of the public object to which it was to be
82
devoted.”
Thus, while necessity may be reserved for the legislature and public use may be reserved for the judiciary, the two are inextricably
connected. While early courts and commentators agreed that necessity is a critical element of eminent domain—that taking property
unnecessarily is unconstitutional—they also clearly viewed the determination of necessity as being a legislative or political one. And even
though the early courts and commentators often distinguished between different necessity issues, the majority of authorities resolved
the issues in the same manner—broad deference to legislative will.
Thus, while early courts might have intervened to prevent a taking,
they typically did do so on necessity grounds only where it was appar83
ent that the legislature had abused its power or acted in bad faith.
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this issue, in
its decision in HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Au84
thority (In re Seattle Popular Monorail Authority). The court noted that
“even though the two terms do overlap to some extent,” there is a difference between stating that condemnation is for a “public use” and
85
that it is a “public necessity.” Although the legislature’s declaration
that the specific use of property is a public use “is entitled to great
weight,” the declaration “is not dispositive,” as the question of public
86
use fundamentally is “a judicial question.” A declaration of the necessity to condemn certain land, by contrast, is “conclusive” absent
“actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct” tantamount to
87
constructive fraud.
In summary, although some states have statutory or constitutional
88
provisions requiring a finding of necessity to support a taking, in
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.; see also Vittetoe v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 123 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1963) (stating that
Lewis’ view of necessity is applicable to an eminent domain dispute).
2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1063.
121 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2005).
Id. at 1175.
Id. (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16).
Id.
The language of the North Dakota statute is typical of such provisions:
Before property can be taken it must appear:
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law.
2. That the taking is necessary to such use.
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to
be applied is a more necessary public use.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–15–05 (2008). For similar statutes, see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.270
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–1112 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7–704 (2008);
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70–30–111 (2008).
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most states the requirement arises through judicial application of
constitutional principles pertaining to eminent domain and due
process. Regardless of whether the requirement of necessity arises
statutorily or through judicial doctrine, the courts are generally reluctant to review necessity determinations, generally imposing a very
narrow standard of review based on abuse of discretion, arbitrary and
89
capricious decisionmaking, or bad faith. Moreover, the courts make
90
clear that the standard is one of reasonable, not absolute, necessity.
Nonetheless, necessity review provides some hope for targets of an
eminent domain action, especially if the proceeding is disputed in
state court. Although courts are deferential to the condemnor’s findings regarding necessity, state courts do occasionally overturn takings
on necessity grounds. The next three Parts of this Article will examine these possibilities. First, the court may view the municipal plan as
too speculative or remote to be justified. Second, the municipality
may not have surmounted all procedural or regulatory requirements.
Third, the land sought by the municipality may exceed what is necessary to fulfill the stated public purpose. The next Part examines the
decisions in these three categories where landowners have success91
fully challenged taking efforts on necessity grounds.
II. THE EMINENT DOMAIN PLAN IS TOO REMOTE OR SPECULATIVE
Eminent domain doctrine has long cast a skeptical eye upon takings that appear speculative in nature. Nichols asserted in his treatise, for example, that “if [a] proposed taking savored at all of a municipal law speculation, no court would hesitate to hold it

89

90

91

See Swenson v. County of Milwaukee, 63 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Wis. 1954) (“[C]ourts will not
disturb . . . [a determination of necessity] in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion.” (quoting 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 108)). See also King v. City of
McCaysville, 33 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Ga. 1945) (“In the absence of bad faith, the exercise of
the right of eminent domain rests largely in the discretion of the authority exercising
such right, as to the necessity, and what and how much land shall be taken.”); Seba v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 253 P.2d 559, 561 (Okla. 1953) (“The ordinary rule in condemnation cases is that while the particular property sought to be condemned must be necessary
for the proposed project, the condemnor’s decision as to the necessity for taking particular property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.”).
See Falkner v. N. States Power Co., 248 N.W.2d 885, 894 (Wis. 1977) (“In determining necessity neither the legislature nor its delegate is limited to takings that are absolutely or
indispensably necessary. Necessary in this context has been construed to mean reasonably necessary, reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the public purpose for which the property is sought; necessary does not mean absolutely imperative.”).
For a categorization of necessity cases, see 71 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 97 (2008).
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92

unconstitutional.”
Challengers to takings (i.e., landowners) can
thus weaken the strong presumption that necessity exists by showing
that the future use is somehow uncertain, unplanned, or indeterminate.
A. The Plan Is Uncertain
The courts have long held that condemnors may take property
not only for current public needs, but also for future needs that may
93
be reasonably anticipated. A basic requirement of condemning for
future uses is that the condemnor must at the very least have plans
94
for using the land in the future. Those plans can be quite vague,
provided the condemnor is acting in good faith. In Port of Umatilla v.
95
Richmond, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court found that a
port authority could consider probable future needs, as well as known
present needs, in determining the extent of land to be taken, pro96
vided its estimation of future needs was made in good faith.
The “good faith” requirement implies that the condemnor must
have some reasonable basis for anticipating a need for the property
92
93

94

95
96

1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 178.
See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“In determining
whether the taking of property is necessary for public use not only the present demands
of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered.”); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Parachini, 29 Cal. App. 3d 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972) (stating that in determining whether condemnation is necessary for a public use,
“the court is entitled to consider not only present needs, but those which can be fairly anticipated on account of future growth”); City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 97 N.E.2d 766, 772
(Ill. 1951) (condemnor should consider “not only the present needs of the public, but
those which may be fairly anticipated in the future”); White Mountain Power Co. v. Whitaker, 213 A.2d 800, 804 (N.H. 1965) (“[P]roperty may be taken for uses which may be
reasonably anticipated in the future.”); Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla.
1967) (“A future hope based on speculation is not sufficient to justify the taking of private
property in a condemnation proceeding. But a condemning authority may consider
those demands which may be fairly anticipated in the future.”).
E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 480–81 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1961) (taking of easements for phone lines with “no present intention to install
any such lines” and uncertainty as to whether “the public [will ever] receive any benefit
from the acquisition of the[] easements” lacks necessity and cannot be taken by eminent
domain).
321 P.2d 338 (Or. 1958).
Id. at 350–51 (“A condemning corporation may condemn lands sufficient to provide for
not only its present but also its prospective necessities, if it is not more than may in good
faith be presumed necessary for future use within a reasonable time.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); see also City of Waukegan v. Stanczak, 129 N.E.2d 751, 756
(Ill. 1955) (“As to amount, condemning authorities have substantial discretion to take
land sufficient not only for present needs but future requirements . . . which they can and
should anticipate. . . . Unless the discretion is abused or any area grossly excessive is taken . . . the taking will not be disturbed.” (citations omitted)).
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in the future. Where such a basis is lacking, the taking is likely to fail.
97
In Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Huschke, for example, a utility
company sought an easement over private property through eminent
98
domain. The dominant reason put forth by the utility for the taking
was that the utility needed to accommodate a second transmission
99
line sometime in the future. The utility never specified when in the
future the line might be constructed, nor did it specify a concrete
100
plan that needed to be accommodated.
The utility also failed to
obtain necessary governmental approvals for a second transmission
101
line that would have utilized the land at issue.
The trial court
found, without detailed discussion, that the taking for this easement
102
was an abuse of the utility’s powers of eminent domain.
103
Similarly, in State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land in Christiana Hundred,
the Delaware State Highway Department sought to condemn land for
104
a future four-lane highway.
The Department admitted it had no
present plans for a highway and could only anticipate that at “some
105
time in the future” a highway might be required. The Department
had not yet taken any official action in furtherance of construction of
the highway and could not state with any certainty that plans for a
106
highway would eventually be drafted.
Indeed, the only reason the
Department gave for the condemnation was that taking the land was
a money-saving measure in what was apparently a rising real estate
107
market. While the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that saving
taxpayer dollars by buying land early was a “very commendable purpose,” this reasoning, combined with the lack of any specifics regarding time and plans, did not constitute sufficient necessity to take the
108
land at issue.
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

409 A.2d 153 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 157. The utility justified the taking by stating that it required access to install the
power line, flexibility to determine power line location, and a need for a buffer zone. Id.
at 156–57. The court concluded that these justifications did not apply to the defendant.
Id. at 157.
See id. (suggesting the plan was indeterminate).
Id.
Id.
112 A.2d 857 (Del. 1955).
See id. at 858, 860 (detailing the highway improvements that caused the Delaware State
Highway Department to seek to acquire the defendants’ land).
Id. at 860.
See id. (“[T]he Department had taken no official action whatsoever for the construction
of a four-lane highway.”).
See id. (“[T]he Department acknowledged . . . that the taking of a 100 foot right-of-way at
this time was largely in order to save money for the state . . . .”).
Id.
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Likewise, in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chicago & North
109
Western Transportation Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld
the lower court’s dismissal of an eminent domain petition on the
110
grounds that the condemnor had failed to show “necessity.”
The
regents of the University had negotiated to purchase property from a
railroad, but the negotiations failed and the railroad accepted an offer from another purchaser instead. The regents then sought to
111
condemn the property.
The University had no concrete plans for
the property but had considered several types of potential but mutu112
ally exclusive uses.
The trial court was statutorily charged with the task of determin113
ing whether the taking “appear[ed] to be necessary.” “Necessity in
this context” required a showing by the condemnor that the property
was being taken for an identifiable public purpose for use “now or in
114
the near future.” The appellate court found that the University was
unlawfully attempting to “stockpil[e]” the land for speculative future
115
use.
Not only had the University not included the property on its
master plan, but the Regents had not approved any project for the
land and environmental contamination present on the property
meant that a multi-year remediation process would be required be116
fore it could be used for any of the proposed purposes.
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals restricted the scope of
this ruling in subsequent cases, stating first that “necessity cannot be
thwarted by alleging that . . . the purpose for condemning the property is too speculative if in fact the project is officially supported by
the governmental entity and ordinary agreements are in place to real117
ize the project,” and second, that “[t]he rule established in Re-

109
110
111
112

113
114
115

116

117

552 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 578, 580.
Id. at 580.
See id. (“[A]lthough the University claims to have at least three potential uses for the land,
the uses are mutually exclusive, and the Board of Regents has not yet approved a single
project for the property.”).
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 117.075 (1994)).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex. rel. City of Duluth v. Duluth St.
Ry., 229 N.W. 883, 884 (Minn. 1930)).
See Regents, 552 N.W.2d at 580 (“The University may well have the right to purchase this
property, but it cannot acquire it for speculative future use (stockpiling) by condemnation.”).
See id. (“[B]ecause of soil contamination problems . . . the University could not currently
use the property for any of its proposed uses. The parties have not yet agreed on a remediation plan . . . [which will require] approximately two to seven years . . . .”).
Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Opus N.W., L.L.C. (In re Condemnation by Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency), 582 N.W.2d 596, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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gents . . . is limited by the extreme facts present in that controversy.”
The appellate court has also emphasized the deference accorded the
trial court’s finding in necessity determinations. In an unpublished
2006 decision, Economic Development Authority v. Hmong-American Shopping Center, L.L.C., for example, the court of appeals rejected the argument by a landowner that the taking of its land for blight-clearing
purposes failed the necessity test simply because the condemnor admitted “that there was no definite use, plan, or design concept for the
land beyond the acquisition, demolition, and remediation of the
119
property to prepare it for redevelopment.”
Rather, the appellate
court found that the trial court had not clearly erred in finding that
the condemnor’s determination of necessity was not manifestly arbi120
trary or unreasonable.
Unlike the nebulous actions by the condemnor in Regents, the condemnor in Hmong-American Shopping Center
had included the disputed parcel within its plans and had adopted
resolutions finding it was in the public interest and necessary for the
condemnor to acquire the property, through negotiation or condemnation, in order to eliminate blight, increase the tax base, and
121
bolster the public health and welfare.
The condemnor had provided both a plan and a timeline (of less than one year) for clearing
122
the property and remediating any environmental problems. Moreover, both the condemnor and the condemnee agreed that redevelopment could not occur unless the condemnor acquired the con123
demnee’s parcel. The court found that the only similarity between
the instant case and Regents was the “lack of a finalized and specific
use for the land after the removal of blight and environmental contamination,” but also held that “Regents does not require that a final
124
design concept be in place” prior to the taking.

118
119
120

121
122
123

124

Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
No. A05–1239, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 438, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 9, 2006).
See id. at *13 (“Here, we must give deference to the district court’s findings and ultimate
conclusion that the [Economic Development Authority (“EDA”)] sufficiently demonstrated necessity.”).
See id. at *4–5 (discussing the EDA board’s resolutions).
See id. at *14 (“[T]he EDA had both a plan and timeline—of less than a year—for razing
the buildings and remediation of the environmental damage . . . .”).
See id. at *13 (“[T]he board of commissioners of the EDA had adopted a resolution finding that it was in the public interest and was necessary for the EDA to proceed with the
proposed redevelopment and to acquire the property through negotiation or by eminent
domain . . . .”).
Id. at *14.
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B. The Timing of the Plan’s Execution Is Too Vague
Condemnation actions can also fail for lack of necessity where the
timing of the proposed public use is uncertain or so far in the future
as to make the use itself speculative. While condemnors may find it
fiscally advantageous to condemn early and to accumulate land for
125
anticipated future uses, courts have struck down such plans on necessity grounds. For example, in Board of Education v. Baczewski, the
Michigan Supreme Court struck down a school board’s attempt to
take property for a high school site that would not be needed for thir126
ty years or more. The school board made clear that its actions were
motivated by economic planning and a desire to save future taxpayers
money by acquiring the land far in advance of anticipated need,
127
while the land was still undeveloped and hence less valuable. The
court held that the state constitution’s requirement that there be
128
“necessity for using such property” meant that the condemnor had
to show that the property would be either used immediately or within
129
“the near future” or a “reasonably immediate” time.
Similarly, the California Appellate Court found that while the
condemnor was permitted to condemn an easement for electric lines,
its efforts to take gas and telephone line easements across the same
land failed for lack of necessity because the condemnor had made no
showing that it contemplated future installation of such lines; rather,
it was only trying “to cover the possibility of a need” for an easement

125

126
127
128

129

As explained in Donald M. Zupanec, Eminent Domain: Validity of Appropriation of Property
for Anticipated Future Use, 80 A.L.R. 3D 1085 (1977):
The motives behind the desire for present condemnation of property to be used
in the future are both obvious and understandable. The rule that any taking of
private property for a public use requires the payment of just compensation, coupled with the fact that the value of real property follows an ever-increasing spiral,
makes it manifestly more economical for a condemnor to acquire property at present, when its value is less, than to delay condemnation until the point in the future when immediate use is planned, by which time the value of the property inevitably will have risen, as will the amount of compensation which will have to be
paid. Moreover, land-use planning may be made more effective and less disruptive
where future needs can be anticipated and property acquired ahead of time to
provide therefor.
Id. § 2(a) (footnote omitted).
65 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Mich. 1954).
See id. (“Appellee instituted this proceeding long before there was need for a new high
school site, in order to save money.”).
MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. 13, § 2 (“When private property is taken for the use or benefit
of the public, the necessity for using such property . . . shall be ascertained by a
jury . . . .”). This language does not appear in the current Michigan State Constitution.
Baczewski, 65 N.W.2d at 813 (internal quotations omitted).

124

[Vol. 12:1

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
130

for such purposes at some unspecified time in the future. Likewise,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a taking of farmland to satisfy a projected need for new school buildings within the
next five-to-twelve years was an abuse of discretion, albeit made in
good faith, because the “probable need” for the land was based on
“assumptions and possibilities that [had] been challenged by contrary
131
evidence.”
While the court acknowledged that a school district
needs to engage in long-term planning for future needs and that
purchase of land to meet those needs was “proper and commendable,” the court found that condemnation of land to support such
needs would require “more” support than mere “projections based
132
Yet, it is unclear what that
on possible housing development.”
something “more” would be, as the court also acknowledged that the
projections used to calculate future needs were “based on the best
available information” and that the school board relied upon those
133
figures in good faith in calculating its future needs. Presumably, it
was the five-to twelve-year time horizon that gave the court pause.
Certainly, condemnors can take property somewhat in advance of
the anticipated public use. For example, the California Appellate
Court upheld a condemnation for a school to be built within four
134
years of the taking and the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the taking of land for utility purposes where the land was needed to satisfy
present and future demands for power reasonably anticipated within
135
the next five years. Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court permitted the taking of extra land to enable a planned two-lane highway to
be expanded into a four-lane divided highway at an unspecified time
136
in the future when funds permitted its construction.
The court’s
holding may have been influenced by the fact that traffic counts already justified the wider road, and it apparently was only a lack of
funding that resulted in the narrower road being first built.
Similarly, the Kentucky Appellate Court saw no lack of necessity or
excess condemnation when a municipality condemned land for

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 480 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
In re Condemnation by Octorara Area Sch. Dist., 556 A.2d 527, 527, 531 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989).
Id. at 531.
Id.
Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 172–73 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
Shelor v. W. Power & Gas Co., 449 P.2d 591, 593 (Kan. 1969).
Woollard v. State Highway Comm’n, 249 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Ark. 1952).
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137

planned construction of a reservoir thirty years hence.
The court
noted that customary planning practice was to project water needs
138
thirty years out, and noted that “a municipality may also procure
land in contemplation of such reasonable necessity as may arise in
139
the future.”
The Florida Appellate Court went even further, upholding a condemnation for park purposes, even though the exact
nature of the park was not known at the time of condemnation, and
even though it was uncertain where the park would be constructed
(although it was acknowledged that the city had no immediate inten140
tion of pursuing the park use).
The difficulty lies in determining just how far in the future the
public purpose may lie without running afoul of necessity determina141
tions. This issue was addressed in City of Phoenix v. McCullough. The
Phoenix city council passed an ordinance authorizing city officials to
acquire two parcels of land by eminent domain to expand a local air142
port.
In August 1969, the city commenced an action to condemn
143
five lots owned by the McCulloughs. According to the airport master development plan, twenty percent of the McCulloughs’ property
would be used between 1984 and 1992 and the remaining eighty per144
cent would be used by 2015.
According to the city, these specific

137
138
139
140

141
142

143
144

See McGee v. City of Williamstown, 308 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
See id. at 797 (“The thirty-year [water use] projection into the future is . . . a customary
procedure in planning water reservoirs.”).
Id. at 796.
See City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co., 352 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (“[I]t is not necessary that a condemnor, representing the state or a political subdivision of the state, have funds on hand, plans and specifications prepared and all other
preperations necessary for immediate construction before it can determine the necessity
for taking property for a public use. In point of fact, it is the duty of public officials to
look to the future and plan for the future . . . .” (quoting Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control
Dist. v. Wye River Farms, Inc., 297 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)) (emphasis omitted)).
536 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
See id. at 231 (“On August 12, 1969, the City Council of the City of Phoenix passed Ordinance No. S-4878 authorizing various city officials to acquire title to two parcels of land
‘for the purpose of expanding, improving and developing Sky Harbor Municipal Airport.’”).
See id. (“Pursuant to this ordinance, the City on August 28, 1969 instituted this action
seeking to condemn the lots owned by the McCulloughs.”).
See id. at 232 (“According to this Master Plan, approximately 20% of the McCullough
property would be used between 1984 and 1992 and the remaining 80% would be used in
the year 2015.”).
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parcels were being taken to permit the expansion of air freight facili145
ties and ancillary services, as well as to provide off-street parking.
An Arizona state statute provided: “[b]efore property may be tak146
en, it shall appear that . . . [t]he taking is necessary to such use.”
The appellate court noted that the phrase “necessary to such use”
unavoidably introduces a time element into the evaluations of the va147
lidity of the taking.
Although the court acknowledged that a condemnor could “legitimately consider future needs in determining
148
what property and the amount of property is necessary for use,” the
court also questioned “how far in the future . . . the condemnor
149
[may] crystal gaze before the taking loses the essence of necessity.”
The court appeared to view the consideration of necessity through
150
the lens of a balancing test. On the one hand, a city has legitimate
fiscal interests in taking as much land as possible as early as possible
151
in a rising land market. Takings for future uses also enable system152
atic long-term planning for public use.
On the other hand, landowners have a strong interest in retaining possession of their land,
not only to reap the benefits of rising land values but also to reap the
153
benefits of ownership of real property.
Moreover, private ownership benefits the city because it keeps land available for public taxa-

145

146
147
148
149

150
151
152
153

See id. (“[T]he McCullough Properties ‘were required at the time this said action was filed
to provide for the expansion of the airfreight [sic] facilities and to provide ancillary services necessary thereof.’”).
Id. at 235 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12–1112 (1956)).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236. The court rejected the city’s initial argument that a legislative determination
of necessity per se removes the decision from judicial scrutiny, although the court also
stated that “a condemnor’s determination of necessity should not be disturbed on judicial
review in the absence of fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct.” Id. at 235.
See id. at 236 (stating that necessity review “requires a balancing of competing interests”).
See id. (“Obviously, a condemnor considering future needs is interested in the legitimate
pursuit of saving taxpayers’ money . . . .”).
See id. (“[A] systematic planning for future public use should be encouraged.”).
See id. (“Equally as obvious is the interest of the private landowner in holding and using
his property as long as possible, not only to take advantage of rising real estate values, but
also to enjoy the advantages that land ownership affords.”); see also Zupanec, supra note
125, § 2(a):
As the condemnor gains economically by present acquisition, so does the landowner lose. If condemnation occurs at any point in time substantially prior to the
point at which the property is actually used, the owner will have received less in
compensation than would have been the case had condemnation been delayed
and the property permitted to appreciate. Additionally, the owner generally has
an interest, whether tangible or intangible, in retaining possession of his property
for as long as possible. Whether the property is used for residential or business
purposes, its owner normally is reluctant, for personal or economic reasons, to
part with it before absolutely necessary.
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154

tion as long as possible.
The challenge, from the McCullough
Court’s perspective, was to “keep within bounds government planners
whose schemes require an ever-increasing diet of private land to satisfy their planning appetites [while] encourag[ing] systematic plan155
ning of acquisition of land for public use.”
Interestingly, after articulating this balancing inquiry, the court
then interpreted the necessity requirement as a simple reasonableness test, stating that a condemning authority can acquire additional
property for future use as long as the proposed public use will occur
156
within “a reasonably foreseeable future.”
A reasonable time, the
court stated, would be determined by the “surrounding circum157
stances.” Here, the city’s proposed use for the property would not
158
occur until fifteen to forty-six years in the future. Moreover, the city
attorney admitted to the trial court that the city knew the plan was going to change over time and there was no way to know today how the
159
lots would actually be used in 2015. The appellate court concluded
that where the condemnor does not know when or how a future use
of condemned property will occur, the future use is “unreasonable,
160
speculative and remote as a matter of law.”
The court hinted that it might have accepted a fifteen-year or
161
even longer future timetable as reasonable. However, the decadeslong delay in property use, combined with the possibility that even
the fifteen-year use might change, compelled the court to override
the city’s decision to condemn. The court seemed to reach this outcome reluctantly, remarking that it had “no other choice” but to
162
reach this conclusion. Thus, although the McCullough court recognized in general terms that municipalities may condemn property for
future use, it found that the condemnation at issue was for a purpose
so remote and speculative, it could not be upheld.

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

See McCullough, 536 P.2d at 236 (“[T]here is something to be said for keeping private real
property on the tax rolls as long as that property is not needed for public use.”).
Id.
Id. (quoting City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 407 P.2d 91, 95 (Ariz. 1965)).
Id.
See id. (questioning the reasonableness of a time fifteen to forty-six years in the future).
See id. (“[T]here is question of whether the City will even use the property in 1984 or
2015.”).
Id. at 237; see also id. (“[E]ven this 15-year use might change . . . .”).
See id. (stating that in the absence of uncertainty as to future use, the court “might hesitate to hold that 15 years in the future was not a reasonable time for future planning”).
Id. at 236. The court cited the attorney’s trial court remarks and the reference to the
city’s master plan as a “‘general concept and guide.’” Id. at 236. The court cited no other
evidence beyond the length of time to support its no-necessity determination. Id. at 236–
37.
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Other courts have found a lack of necessity with even shorter time
horizons than those found in McCullough. In Meyer v. Northern Indiana
163
Public Service Co., for example, a utility sought to take two rights-ofway by eminent domain—one for a 345 kilovolt (kV) power line and
164
one for a 138 kV power line. While the utility offered specific evidence about the need for the 345 kV line, it lacked the same evidence
165
for the 138 kV line. An engineer testified that the 138 kV line was
to service an “anticipated load” in the future, but the utility had no
documentation regarding the planning of the 138 kV line and no
166
specific plans for its development.
The engineer could not state
whether the 138 kV line would be constructed more than six years
from the date of the trial court hearing. Furthermore, one of the
landowners testified that he was told that at least ten years would pass
167
before the 138 kV line would be constructed. The Court reasoned
that the need for the 138 kV line was purely speculative and ruled in
favor of the landowner on the grounds of lack of necessity.
Meyer appears similar to McCullough—in both, the court struck
down the condemnation as lacking necessity, except that the Meyer
court seemed to be less tolerant of a delay much shorter than that
found in McCullough. The explanation may lie in the degree of planning engaged in by the two condemnors. In McCullough, the city had
a specific, written plan for future use of the condemned property, albeit with very long time horizons. In Meyer, by contrast, the utility
had no such written plan and could not even hazard a guess as to
when the land would be used. This suggests that an additional factor
that can influence how a court views a condemnation for future use is
the degree of planning engaged in by the condemnor. The less defined the time horizon for use, and the less defined the plan, the
more likely it may be that the condemnee can successfully challenge
the taking for future use on necessity grounds.
In Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, for example, the Utah Supreme
Court struck down a proposed taking for park and recreation pur-

163
164

165
166

167

258 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. 1970).
See id. at 58 (“[T]he present plans and need call for a 345 KV transmission line
and . . . the appellee would need 150 feet right-of-way width for the construction and
maintenance of such a line.”).
See id. (“[T]here were no memoranda concerning the planning of the 138 KV line . . . .”).
Id. The engineer testified, “we really haven’t started planning. This is ahead of any planning that I would get into. Planning of the line has not actually begun except that we
have an anticipated load that’s the reason that we are doing what we are.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
See id. (“Mr. Etzler had represented to the property owners that it would be ten years or
more before the 138 KV line would be constructed . . . .”).

Oct. 2009]

NECESSITY AS A CHECK ON STATE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

poses on the basis of lack of necessity.
Supreme Court noted that:

168

129

In support of its holding, the

[N]o defined plan[] ha[s] been adopted or approved, . . . no time frame
of use within the reasonably foreseeable future ha[s] been determined, . . . a voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use some
six years prior ha[s] not as yet been placed to its intended purpose,
and . . . no funds ha[ve] been requested, budgeted, appropriated or were
169
presently in existence to place the property in question to use.

These cases suggest that unless the condemnor’s future plans are
outrageously distant in the future, challengers to takings (i.e., landowners) must weaken the strong necessity presumption by showing
that the future taking is somehow uncertain, unplanned, or indeter170
minate.
Ultimately, the indeterminacy and time issues might be
evaluated together in a kind of linked continuum. The more distant
the proffered time of the use of the property, the less indeterminacy
might be required to destroy any necessity presumption.
C. Other Considerations Prevent a Justification of Necessity
Although courts have rejected municipal actions without any plan
to develop the property as lacking necessity, even when a municipality presents specific plans and goals to justify a taking, it may not survive a judicial review of necessity. In Hodges v. Jacksonville Transporta171
tion Authority, for example, the Florida court of appeals found that a
municipal transit authority had failed to make its requisite showing
that its condemnation of the petitioner’s land was reasonably necessary where at least four, and possibly five, other routes were available
to it, and where the city already owned a substantial portion of the
right of way for the road were it to be built in the original proposed
172
alignment.
In City of Helena v. DeWolf, municipal planners sought to redevelop
173
a blighted commercial area.
The plan sought to consolidate land

168
169
170

171
172
173

567 P.2d 182, 184 (Utah 1977).
Id.
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 552 N.W.2d 578, 580
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that although condemning for future use is permissible,
the university’s taking failed for lack of necessity because it had not included the condemned property in its master plan; had articulated three mutually exclusive uses for the
property, none of which had been approved by the Board of Regents; and soil contamination would prevent use of the unremediated land for any of the three purposes, yet no
remediation plan had been devised).
353 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 1215.
508 P.2d 122, 124 (Mont. 1973).
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ownership, demolish unsuitable structures, and install public improvements, such as sewers, curbs, and accessible streets in order to
174
Some buildings were kept in spite of
attract private development.
175
their poor state because of their historical significance.
Other
176
buildings were rehabilitated or destroyed altogether. City planners
177
picked and chose which tracts to take in a broad area. Planners selected the defendant’s property for taking, although the court found
the defendant’s property was not substandard or blighted, despite be178
ing in a blighted area.
The defendants claimed that the city lacked necessity to take their
property, a 9000 square foot tract with a supermarket and commer179
cial stores.
The property was located on the extreme edge of the
180
urban renewal project.
Further, although defendants admitted to
the necessity of urban renewal, they challenged the necessity of the
particular use associated with their property, an outer parking area
181
for more centralized businesses in the urban redevelopment area.
At trial, planners introduced, according to the court, “considerable evidence” about the plan and the specific uses of defendants’
182
property, including traffic and parking requirements.
In spite of
these efforts, the court determined that the city failed to present suf183
ficient proof of necessity.
The court’s reasoning is instructive. First, the court took into account the geographic location of the parcel within the entire project,
stating that because the “[d]efendants’ property stands at the extreme edge of the project[, i]t can be eliminated from the project

174

175
176
177
178

179
180
181

182
183

See id. (“[The Urban Renewal Agency] consolidat[es] land ownership, install[s] public
improvements such as streets, sewers and curbs, and demolish[es] existing structures on
an area basis.”).
See id. (“Some dilapidated properties were being kept for historical purposes.”).
See id. (“Some properties were shown as to rehabilitation projects.”).
See id. (“The properties taken are on a selective basis . . . .”).
See id. (“Defendants’ property was inspected and found to be lacking in meeting what
were called ‘code standards’ in some respects; but the record is clear, and the trial court
found, that the necessary improvements could and would [have been] made except for
this litigation.”).
Id. at 123–24.
Id. at 128.
See id. at 126 (noting that defendant’s brief described the plan to be “a ‘planner’s dream
expressed in architectural drawings’”). The plan consisted of a ‘shopping center’ model
whereby the commercial zone would be surrounded by streets and parking, thereby separating vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Id. at 124.
Id. at 127.
See id. (“[W]e do not find sufficient credible testimony to uphold the district court’s findings.”).
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184

without harming the balance of the project.” The court cited testimony by city officials admitting that the renewal plan could be
amended to eliminate the defendants’ land for the project without
185
interfering with parking or traffic flows.
The court thus appears to distinguish between core and peripheral properties. Properties at the geographical edge might demand a
greater showing of necessity from city planners. Perhaps this reasoning was implicit in the McCullogh Court’s decision to dismiss a taking
of property for the airport. Recall that the land at issue was not for a
central terminal or airstrip, but for the expansion of freight facilities
and ancillary services. The difference between core and peripheral
might not just be a geographical distinction, it might also apply to the
plan itself. If the core purpose of the plan is to build a highway, for
example, ancillary needs such as commuter parking lots and rest
stops might receive more judicial scrutiny under a necessity challenge.
More fundamentally, the DeWolf court reviewed the necessity determination by examining the “particular property” at issue and not
186
simply the entire project. This reasoning creates particular advantages for the landowner because it weakens or severs the necessity review from the overall context of the overall plan, neighborhood, or
goals. For example, many states have statutes promoting condemna187
tion in blighted areas.
Interpreted most broadly, if a necessity review demands a focus on the particular property, does that mean that
taking a non-blighted property should be examined absent from the
blighted area surrounding it? If so, then takings of broad urban areas
for redevelopment might be particularly difficult because an individual non-blighted property could thwart the development of a large
scale public project such as a highway, stadium, or shopping center.
The court recognized the widely-held rule that taking broad areas is
184
185
186

187

Id. at 128.
See id. (using testimony from engineers to show that the project “would not alter the effectiveness of the street in serving the area”).
Id. at 129 (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Crossen-Nissen Co., 400 P.2d 283, 284
(Mont. 1965)). In State Highway Commission v. Crossen-Nissen Co., the court stated:
The requirement that the condemnor must show necessity for the property taken
does not mean that it must be indispensable to the proposed project. Rather the
word ‘necessary’ as used in section 93–9905 means that the particular property
taken be reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it is sought under the peculiar circumstances of each case.
400 P.2d at 284.
While some statutes define blight broadly, others, especially those passed after Kelo was
decided, are quite restrictive. See Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in
Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 195–99 (2007) (discussing legislation that
prohibits the use of eminent domain for development).
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necessary to clear blighted areas and prevent their return, but also
stated that if the specific property is not necessary for the blighted
188
area’s clearance, then the “area concept” does not apply.
This pinpoint-style review is not universally accepted. For example, in City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the District Court of Appeals had misinterpreted precedent in
189
denying a city’s condemnation of land for redevelopment purposes.
The Court of Appeals had relied upon Ball v. City of Tallahassee, which
held that “[t]he city must present evidence pinpointing the need for
190
the particular property . . . sought to be condemned.” The Court of
Appeals found that the taking failed because of the lack of “some
specific plan for development of the property in the reasonably foreseeable future, including plans for financing such a vast undertak191
ing.” The Florida Supreme Court, however, noted that the primary
principle articulated in Ball is that a condemnor must show some
“reasonable necessity” for its taking; once it has done so, the condemnee “must then either concede the existence of a necessity or be
prepared to show bad faith or abuse of discretion as an affirmative
192
defense.” The Florida Supreme Court thus found that Ball “placed
an unreasonable gloss” on earlier Florida eminent domain decisions
insofar as it required pinpointing the need for the particular property
193
at issue. The court reasoned that otherwise each landowner would
be able to argue, “Why not my neighbor?” and thus harm the pros194
pects for eminent domain projects.

188
189
190
191
192
193
194

DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 127–28.
346 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1977) [hereinafter Griffin II].
281 So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. 1973).
Griffin v. City of Jacksonville, 314 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) [hereinafter,
Griffin I].
Griffin II, 346 So. 2d at 990.
Id. at 991.
See id. (“Were the City not permitted to exercise its discretion in good faith as to the sequence of the parcels to be condemned, then each landowner would be able to raise the
question, ‘Why not my neighbor?’ and thereby effectively frustrate commencement or
continuation of the project. Such is not and cannot be the law.”); see also City of Hollywood Cmty. Redev. Agency v. 1843, LLC, 980 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(“The condemning authority need not present evidence pinpointing the need for the
particular property sought to be condemned.”). By analogy, courts have ruled that a nonblighted property in a blighted area may be subject to eminent domain as the condition
of the total area determines its blight status and not individual parcels of land. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, What Constitutes “Blighted Area” Within Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 3D 1096, § 2(b) (1972) (noting that courts are generally concerned with the blighted status of an entire area rather than that of individual
properties).
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Returning to DeWolf, the final point worth mentioning is the
grounds upon which the DeWolf Court reached its no-necessity determination. Even though the city proffered considerable evidence
on its plans and goals, the court found no present necessity because
the commercial businesses upon which the demand for parking
195
The structures for the
would be based had not been established.
planned business had not yet been built. No assurances were given
that private enterprise would take root. Even with robust private enterprise present, the city could not ensure that the defendants’ land
was necessary for parking. The court viewed the city’s motivation in
taking the property as simply “to await money, motivation, and hopes
196
of the planners.”
The Court defined necessity as “a reasonable
197
need with foreseeable ability to complete.” The city was required to
show necessity, according to the Court, for both the amount of parking needed and the probability that the buildings that required the
198
parking would also be constructed.
Failing that, the Court stated,
199
takings would only be limited by “the architect’s imagination.”
In essence, DeWolf instructs that city planners cannot “bootstrap”
necessity by taking some land for public use and then using that taking as proof of necessity for additional condemnations. Florida and
Montana are in agreement. In the similar case of Baycol, Inc. v. Down200
town Development Authority, the city sought to take land for a shopping mall, and argued that the businesses there would create the ne201
cessity of parking and further takings. The Court refused to permit
the taking, reasoning that the city was placing “the cart before the
horse” by attempting to create necessity by taking other property and
202
applying it to a private interest. As Baycol affirmed, allowing such a
taking for this reason would create a “dangerous precedent” and allow municipalities to circumvent necessity or public use inquiries for
203
any property considered ancillary to the main redevelopment plan.

195

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

See City of Helena v. DeWolf, 508 P.2d 122, 128 (Mont. 1973) (“It is clear . . . that need for
the parking . . . is not a present need nor a need in the reasonably foreseeable future. . . . Thus, the concept of necessity for a public use is a possible future necessity.”).
Id.
Id. at 129–30.
Id.
Id. at 129.
315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
See id. at 458 (“It was also shown . . . that the creation of the shopping mall was to create
the need for the public parking proposed.”).
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 458.
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The lesson from these cases is that the failure to cite any specific
time frames whatsoever for use of the land will place the necessity of
the taking in doubt. Furthermore, taking land for the sole purpose
of purchasing early in a rising real estate market will not constitute
sufficient necessity to take a private owner’s land. In addition, the
failure to obtain specific approvals will also weigh against necessity. It
is questionable whether any municipality today, especially in light of
the Kelo-fueled backlash against eminent domain, would condemn
land with so little planning of its intended future use.
III.

PROCEDURAL OR REGULATORY HURDLES EXIST TO SUCCESSFUL
DEVELOPMENT

As a general matter, statutory grants of condemnation power are
strictly construed, and condemnation actions in violation of the statu204
tory grant are invalid. The most obvious bureaucratic requirement
that municipalities fail to follow, thereby showing lack of necessity, is
their own written development plan. In State v. Pacific Shore Land Co.,
the State of Oregon sought land for the development of a highway
205
“right of way,” as stated by a resolution of the Highway Commission.
The court ruled that a portion of the land sought by the State fell
outside the specific right of way specified in the State’s plan and was
thus not necessary for development; as a result, the court blocked the
206
State’s efforts to take the land.
In Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. City of Omaha, the City of Omaha, Nebraska devised a “Master Plan” designed to redevelop a large
207
area of blighted East Omaha for commercial and industrial sites.
The plaintiff owned vacant land in the area, and planned to use the
land for development of storage tanks to store production materials,

204

205
206
207

See, e.g., Village of Skokie v. Gianoulis, 632 N.E.2d 106, 111–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“It is
well established in Illinois that laws conferring the authority to take private property by
exercising the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed . . . . A statutory grant
of eminent domain power can only be exercised in the manner authorized by statute.”
(citations omitted)); see also McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easment & Right-of-Way Across
Twp. 12 N., 87 P.3d 479, 481 (Mont. 2004) (“[F]undamental real property rights require
that ‘public uses’ for which the power of eminent domain are granted must be interpreted pursuant to the plain language set forth by the Legislature and cannot be implied.”).
269 P.2d 512, 520 (Or. 1954) (discussing the Oregon Highway Commission’s resolution).
See id. (“Plaintiff ha[s] no authority under its resolution . . . to proceed by condemnation
action . . . .”).
277 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Neb. 1979).
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208

such as asphalt.
The plaintiff stated that although it was not currently using the land, the vacant land was so important to its operations that “if we don’t have [the vacant land], we have to . . . move the
209
remaining plant to another location.”
After the plan’s approval, the city “selected plaintiff’s property as
the site for . . . [a prison] complex . . . [desired by] the State of Ne210
braska.” The city amended the plan to specifically target the plaintiff’s property, but did not amend the plan’s stated purpose to include a penal complex nor did it amend the provision of the plan
stating that property owned by existing industries for future expan211
sion purposes would not be purchased.
212
The plaintiff challenged the condemnation of its land. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the taking of blighted or substandard property for redevelopment and resale in accordance with an
approved redevelopment plan as provided for by the state develop213
ment statute was a proper public use.
However, here the city had
failed to carry out its redevelopment plan in accordance with its own
214
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s land was
plan document.
taken not to further the redevelopment purposes of the plan, but to
simply accommodate the State’s need for a site for a penal com215
plex.
Because the condemnation of the plaintiff’s land was not a
part of the redevelopment plan, the taking was not for a public purpose, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s is216
suance of an injunction.

208
209
210
211
212

213

214
215
216

See id. (“Presently there are plans to build two . . . storage tanks on the particular [vacant]
property to take care of off-season purchase of construction-type asphalt.”).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 426–27.
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s public use and constitutional challenges to the taking, finding commercial development a public use and concluding that
economic redevelopment is a sufficiently different purpose than development of manufacturing and industrial sites by eminent domain, which is prohibited by the Nebraska
Constitution. Id. at 427.
See id. at 428 (“The taking of substandard or blighted areas by a city for redevelopment
and resale in accordance with an approved redevelopment plan which is in conformity
with a general plan for the municipality as a whole . . . is a proper public use for a municipality.”).
See id. (“The authority to acquire plaintiff’s land [here] was not provided for in the redevelopment plan in order to carry out the purposes of the plan . . . .”).
See id. (noting the land was acquired “solely as an accommodation to the state to acquire a
site for a penal complex which had nothing to do with the redevelopment plan”).
See id. (“[T]he trial court was correct in issuing an injunction against the proceedings,
and its judgment is affirmed.”).
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The court’s ruling literally rested on public use grounds, but interpreted through a different lens, this could have easily been a necessity case. Instead of stating that acquisition for redevelopment and
penal purposes were a necessary purpose of the plan, the plan simply
created its own procedural hurdle by limiting its scope to development and blight removal and by specifically disavowing any intent to
condemn property held by existing industry for expansion purposes.
Had the plan not contained the latter limitation, city planners might
have been able to simply declare the penal complex a necessity,
217
which under Nebraska law is a legislative question, and might have
been able to take the land with minimal, if any, judicial scrutiny. This
case instructs that city planners can trigger no-necessity findings by
taking actions that do not conform to the goals of the written plan,
and a challenging landowner should thus scour the plan for such inconsistencies.
A municipal agency may also lose at the condemnation proceeding when it fails to adhere to its own statutory limitations of authority.
In Wilmington Parking Authority v. Land With Improvements, the Wilmington Parking Authority (“WPA”) was authorized by statute to take
218
certain land by eminent domain for public parking purposes. The
WPA orchestrated a plan for condemnation of property that would
result in a significant percentage of the parking spaces being reserved
for a local newspaper company, which would also receive the right to
219
purchase land not available to the general public. The court found
that sufficient evidence existed that the primary purpose of taking
the land at issue was to retain the newspaper company as a corporate
220
citizen, rather than to provide the public with parking facilities, and
that the “paramount benefit” from the taking would go to the new221
paper company, not the public. As a result, the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant the WPA’s immediate
222
possession of the private property sought.
217
218
219

220

221
222

See id. at 427 (suggesting that, under Nebraska law, the defendants clearly had the power
to declare the penal complex a necessity).
521 A.2d 227, 228–29 (Del. 1986).
See id. at 233–34 (“The court also noted that approximately ten percent of the 950 new
spaces would be reserved for News-Journal employees. In light of this evidence, the trial
judge estimated that the net benefit to the public would be less than 350 spaces.”).
See id. at 234 (“There is sufficient evidence to support the ultimate finding that the primary purpose of the project was to retain the News-Journal as a corporate citizen rather
than to provide the public with parking facilities.”).
Id. at 230–31.
See id. at 234 (“Therefore, the WPA’s attempted exercise of its limited power of eminent
domain was beyond its statutory authority[] . . . [and] the ruling of the Superior Court
[i]s affirmed.”).
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Although Wilmington discusses the taking in terms of public use
and purpose, the case fundamentally rests upon a determination of
necessity. The dispositive issue in the case was not whether taking
land and transferring it to a private entity was a proper public use.
Delaware law at the time had well settled the notion that a public use
that has a substantial benefit to private interests suffices for a proper
223
taking. Rather, the case addressed whether the WPA’s taking of the
defendant’s land was necessary for the purposes authorized for the
224
WPA to pursue by statute. Again, the city might have avoided this
legal wrangling if it had just sought eminent domain through another
agency with broader statutory authority. In cases such as these, where
the public use prong is interpreted so broadly, often the most viable
opportunity a landowner can hope for is that the municipality bungles its effort to take through poor decision making or its own internal mismanagement.
A municipality may also suffer a no-necessity finding when the trial court to which it presents its condemnation question fails to grant
the landowner even the most basic procedural rights. For example,
in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. B. Willis, C.P.A, Inc., the plaintiff
commenced a condemnation proceeding against the defendant to
225
acquire an easement for the purpose of building a railroad spur.
Pursuant to an Oklahoma statute, the commissioners filed a report
226
with the court, which the landowner-defendant challenged.
The
defendant argued that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie
227
case of necessity.
When the defendant sought discovery to obtain
evidence for trial, the trial court rejected the defendant’s motion and
concluded that the defendant had neither a right to pursue discovery
228
nor to contest the taking of his land. According to the trial court,
the government agency merely needed to allege necessity in its peti229
230
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
tion.
223

224
225
226

227
228
229

See id. at 231 (“This Court has addressed on at least two occasions the question of whether
a taking which results in a substantial benefit to private interests may nevertheless be for
‘public use’ as required by the State and Federal constitutions.” (citing Wilmington Parking v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954), and Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139
A.2d 476 (Del. 1958))).
Wilmington Parking Auth., 521 A.2d at 228–29.
941 P.2d 995, 997 (Okla. 1997).
See id. at 998 (“[Public Services Company (“PSO”)] has put on no proof whatsoever in
support of its petition and none will be required at the hearing on remand before the trial court, as the Court of Civil Appeals has placed the burden of proof on him rather than
the condemning authority where it should be, all in violation of [Oklahoma law].”).
Id.
Id. at 997–98.
Id.
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and—as the court of civil appeals subsequently did—rejected the
landowner’s allegation that the absence of a resolution of necessity by
the condemnor meant that the condemnor lacked a prima facie
231
case.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding that
the condemnor must meet its initial burden of proof in a condemnation case by making a prima facie case of necessity by introducing into evidence a resolution of necessity, at which point the burden of
232
proof shifts to the condemnor to show the taking is not necessary.
The court remarked that the plaintiff never attempted to submit its
necessity resolution as evidence to the trial court, but merely attached
233
the resolution to its supplemental brief.
Because this fact precluded the defendant from challenging the resolution’s introduction
into evidence and forced objections to it to be raised for the first time
on appeal, the court concluded that the defendant had a right to a
hearing on “all aspects of plaintiff’s condemnation” and to challenge
the report that articulates the necessity of the government agency to
234
take land by eminent domain.
The court thus remanded the case
back to the trial court for further proceedings based on the trial
court’s improper denial of the defendant’s right to challenge the
235
plaintiff’s “asserted but unproven right” to take the property.
It is difficult to say where the mishap lay in the plaintiff’s efforts to
take. The trial court’s highly deferential stance towards necessity was
apparently not utterly unreasonable as it was affirmed by the inter236
mediate appellate court.
The intermediate appellate court concluded that filing a necessity resolution was not necessary but the
mere act of filing a petition that alleges necessity creates a rebuttable
237
presumption of the necessity of the taking. Perhaps the most useful
lesson from Willis is that landowners should expect, at a minimum, an
opportunity to be heard at trial, and that courts may not let a mu230
231

232
233

234
235
236
237

Id. at 998–99.
See id. at 998 (“The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the trial court that PSO was not
required to file a copy of a resolution of necessity with its petition . . . and held that a resolution declaring the necessity of the taking was unnecessary . . . .”).
Id.
See id. at 999 (“PSO never attempted to have its resolution admitted into evidence by the
trial court. It simply attached the resolution to a supplemental brief. Willis, therefore,
had no opportunity to challenge its authenticity . . . or present any other objections to the
trial court regarding the purported resolution.”).
Id.
Id. at 1000. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also held the defendant was improperly denied the right to conduct discovery. Id.
Id. at 998.
Id.
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nicipality completely bypass the judicial system based upon its own
determination of necessity. The fact that such a basic right had to be
litigated to a state’s supreme court, however, is an unnerving hint of
how deferential courts can be in eminent domain cases.
Resolution of environmental contamination issues was a leading
cause of a no-necessity finding in Regents of the University of Minnesota
v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., where the University of
Minnesota sought to take by eminent domain a neighboring rail yard
owned by the defendant for the purpose of placing potentially several
238
types of facilities on the land.
As noted earlier, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals concluded that the University’s proposed condemnation was not necessary in part because the University had no specific plan for the land and a University official testified the time be239
fore the property would be used was potentially indefinite. Calling
the University’s efforts “stockpiling,” the court found for the landowner on grounds already examined in this article—the plan was too
speculative and the timeline for development simply too long to
240
prove necessity.
The court cited additional issues, however, that help further illuminate the necessity inquiry. In addition to never receiving permission from its Board of Regents, the University sought to take land that
was currently unusable because it was contaminated with oil during
the years that the then-current landowner used the property as a rail241
road facility.
In addition, the University had not yet reached an
agreement on a remediation plan with the landowner even after sig242
nificant negotiations.
Furthermore, even if a remediation agreement were reached, it would have taken two to seven years beyond
243
that to decontaminate the land. The lesson from Regents is that the
presence of bureaucratic or other hurdles will be relevant for determining the necessity of a taking.
The University’s dilatory conduct before the attempted taking
probably did not help its case. For years, the University apparently
knew that the property owner wanted to sell but took little concrete

238
239
240
241

242
243

552 N.W.2d 578, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
See id. at 580 (“[T]he trial court did not clearly err in finding that the University had
failed to demonstrate the required level of necessity for condemnation.”).
Id.; see also supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
See Regents, 552 N.W.2d at 579 (“The Regents have not yet approved a single project for
the property, allegedly due in part to the uncertainty arising out of the parties’ disagreement over how to address the environmental contamination problems on the property.”).
Id.
Id.
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244

action to purchase the land. Other than obtaining two appraisals,
245
the University did not act. Only after the railroad received an offer
246
from a private interest did the University place an offer of its own.
When the railroad rejected its offer in favor of another, the University
247
then chose to proceed by eminent domain.
It is impossible to know whether the University’s pre-take conduct
influenced the judge’s decision. The written opinion does not cite
this behavior as a factor for finding lack of necessity. Yet, it poses the
potential for a public relations nightmare simply by characterizing
the University as imposing heavy-handed tactics because it failed to
play by the rules of the commercial marketplace and submit a sufficiently competitive offer. A savvy landowner could also contend that
it was the University’s own sluggishness in failing to act promptly
when it first learned of the intent to sell that caused its failure to obtain the property through ordinary means. Using eminent domain as
an escape hatch for failure in the open market does not create a
sympathetic government entity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For far too long, necessity doctrine has remained the dormant
doctrine of eminent domain. While the necessity requirement has
been largely ignored, the public use requirement has received significant attention. In the wake of the Kelo decision and the broad discretion of eminent domain power that case brings, the public use requirement has been largely neutered as a meaningful check on
condemnation power.
Necessity remains one of the few tools available. In spite of the
opportunities that necessity doctrine brings, there has been virtually
no attention paid to this aspect of eminent domain law. Few attorneys representing landowners appear to raise a necessity challenge.
Even fewer scholars discuss the requirement in depth. The doctrine
is in need of revival.
244

245

246
247

See id. (“The University of Minnesota claims to have been interested in acquiring the
property since 1992 . . . . On several occasions in the subsequent two or three years, representatives from the University and the Railroad discussed the property.”).
See id. at 579–80 (“In October 1994, after the University had obtained two appraisals of
the Railroad’s property, the University became aware that the Railroad had received a
purchase offer from another party.”).
Id. at 580.
See id. (“In early 1995, the University learned that the Railroad had rejected its offer and
had accepted an offer from CSM Investments, Inc. (CSM) to purchase the property. . . .
The University filed a petition to acquire the property by eminent domain in April
1995.”).
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The first step towards a meaningful discussion must be an understanding of its interpretation. Currently, most necessity challenges
are unsuccessful. This does not necessarily mean, however, that necessity must remain dormant. Courts have been willing to stop takings on the grounds that the condemning agency lacked sufficient
necessity. Ranging from a lack of plan specificity to the presence of
regulatory barriers, there are a number of grounds upon which takings may be challenged for lack of necessity. The problem has been
that these cases are few and far between, are scattered across time
and jurisdiction, and have been left out of the larger discussion of the
appropriate limits of eminent domain.
This Article takes a modest first step toward reviving necessity as a
meaningful check on eminent domain power. The cases in this Article and inferences arising from them go some way toward understanding what courts will and will not accept as sufficient necessity. It
also shows examples of condemning agencies proceeding with takings, perhaps overconfidently, with little evidence or support for its
need. Necessity doctrine will not, and should not, grind all but the
most essential of eminent domain proceedings to a halt. Rather,
what a revived doctrine could do at the very least is cause condemning agencies to pause at least briefly and consider possible options before initiating condemnation of a parcel. Justice Brandeis once wrote
248
that sunshine was the best disinfectant. The glare of greater transparency in eminent domain proceedings can improve objective municipal decision making and subject proceedings to public scrutiny
and debate. If necessity doctrine can serve this purpose, and perhaps
a more aggressive role under certain circumstances, it will play an
important role in curbing the excesses of an extraordinary government power.

248

See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”). The book also discusses the
hoarding of wealth by a corporate elite.

